Abstract
Introduction
Consider the following real-life scenario: Alice thinks that she may have some genetic disease, so she wants to investigate it further. She also knows that Bob has a database containing known DNA patterns about various diseases. After Alice gets a sample of her DNA sequence, she sends it to Bob, who will then tell Alice the diagnosis. However, if Alice is concerned about her privacy, the above process is not acceptable because it does not prevent Bob from knowing Alice's private information-both the query and the result. This kind of situation, which is likely to arise as e-commerce develops, motivates the following general problem formulation: Because of its practical importance and also because not much work has been done for approximate pattern matching in the SDA context, our work particularly focuses on approximate pattern matching.
The exact matching problem has been extensively considered in the literature [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13] , even though it can theoretically be solved using the general techniques of secure multi-party computation [10] . The motivation for giving specialized solutions to it is that they are more efficient than those that follow from the above-mentioned general techniques. This is also our motivation in considering approximate pattern matching even though it too is a special case of the general secure multi-party computation problem. Unlike exact pattern matching that produces "yes" and "no" answers, approximate pattern matching measures the difference between the two targets, and produces a score to indicate how different the two targets are. The metrics used to measure the difference usually are heuristic and are application-dependent.
For example, in image template matching [14, 18] , È Ò ½´ µ ¾ and È Ò ½ are used to measure the difference between two sequences and . In DNA sequence matching [15] , edit distance [2] makes more sense than the above measurements; edit distance measures the cost of transforming one given sequence to another given sequence, and its special case, longest common subsequence is used to measure how similar two sequences are.
Solving approximate pattern matching problems within the SDA framework is quite a nontrivial task.
Consider the È Ò ½ metric as an example. The known PIR (private information retrieval) techniques [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13] can be used by Alice to efficiently access each individual without revealing to Bob anything about which (or even which ) Alice accessed (more on this later), but doing this for each individual and then calculating È Ò ½ violates the requirement that Alice should know the total score È Ò ½ without knowing anything other than that score, i.e., without learning anything about the individual values. Using a general secure multi-party computation protocol typically does not lead to an efficient solution. The goals of our research, and the results presented in this paper, are finding efficient ways to do such approximate pattern matchings without disclosing private information.
The actual practice of remote database access does not all fit into the same model we described in the above SDA formulation. For example, in some situations, Bob's database could be proprietary whereas in some others it could be public (in either case the protocol should reveal nothing to Bob about Alice's query). The "proprietary" nature of a database might make the solution more difficult because Alice should not be able to know more information than the response to her query. There is also another practical framework, within which Alice uses Bob to store a (suitable disguised) version of her private database (a form of outsourcing) and whose solutions could be much different. Based on these various practical variants of the problem, we have investigated four SDA models, and defined a class of SDA problems for each model according to the metrics we use for approximate pattern matching. Of course the difficulties of the problems are not the same for the different metrics, and so far we have solved a subset of those problems. A summary of our results is listed below (the results are stated more precisely in Section 4, and the models are defined in Section 3 -in the meantime see Figure 1 in that section for a summary of each model). 
Motivation
Why do we care about the privacy of a database query? In the example used earlier in this section, if a match is found in the database, Bob immediately knows that Alice has such a disease; even worse, after receiving Alice's DNA sequence, Bob can derive much about Alice from the DNA, such as other health problems that Alice might have. If Bob is not trustworthy, Bob could disclose the information about Alice to other parties, and Alice might have difficulty getting employment, insurance, credit, etc. On the other hand, even if Alice trusts Bob, and Bob has no intention of disclosing Alice's private information, Bob might still prefer that Alice's query be kept private out of liability concerns: If Bob knows Alice's DNA information, and that information is accidentally disclosed (perhaps by a disgruntled employee of Bob's, or after a system breakin), Bob might face an expensive lawsuit from Alice. From this perspective, a trusted Bob will actually prefer not to know either Alice's query or its response.
With the growth of the Internet, more and more e-commerce transactions like the above will take place.
There are already DNA pattern databases, public databases about diseases, patent databases, and in the future we may see many more commercial databases and the related database access services, such as fingerprint databases, signature databases, medical record databases, and many more. Privacy will be a major issue in such e-commerce. Assuming the trustworthiness of the service providers, as is done today, is risky; therefore protocols that can support remote access operations while protecting the client's privacy are of growing importance.
One of the fundamental operations behind the queries described in the examples above is pattern matching. Therefore, the basic problem that we face is how to conduct pattern matching operations at the server side while the server has no knowledge of the client's actual query (or the response to it). In some database access situations, exact pattern matching is used, such as query by name, query by social security number, etc. However, in many other situations, exact pattern matching is unrealistic. For instance, in fingerprint matching, even if two fingerprints come from the same finger, they are unlikely to be exactly the same because there is some information loss in the process of deriving an electronic form (usually a complex data structure of features) from a raw fingerprint image. Similarly in voice, face, and DNA matching; in these and many other situations, exact matching is not expected and some form of approximate pattern matching is more useful.
Background Information on Secure Multi-party Computation
The above problem is a special case of the general secure multi-party computation problem [28] . Generally speaking, a multi-party computation problem deals with computing any probabilistic function on any input, in a distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring independence of the inputs, correctness of the computation, and that no more information is revealed to a participant in the computation than can be computed from that participant's input and output [12] . Other examples of such computations include: elections over the Internet, electronic bidding, joint signatures, and joint decryption. The history of the multi-party computation problem is extensive since it was introduced by Yao [28] and extended by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [23] , and by many others: GoldWasser [12] predicts that "the field of multi-party computations is today where public-key cryptography was ten years ago, namely an extremely powerful tool and rich theory whose real-life usage is at this time only beginning but will become in the future an integral part of our computing reality".
Goldreich states in [10] that the general secure multi-party computation problem is solvable in theory.
However, Goldreich also points out that using the solutions derived by these general results for special cases of multi-party computation, are impractical; special solutions should be developed for special cases for efficiency reasons.
One of the well-known special cases of multi-party computation is the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem: The problem consists of a client and server. The client needs to get the th bit of a binary sequence from the server without letting the server know the ; the server does not want the client to know the binary sequence either. A solution for this problem is not difficult; however an efficient solution, in particular a solution with minimal communication cost, is not easy. Studies [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13] have shown that one can design a protocol to solve the PIR problem with much better communication complexity than the theoretical solutions. Pattern matching is another such specific computation, and the recent progress in the PIR problem motivated us to speculate that there exist solutions that are better than the general theoretical one for this particular kind of secure multi-party computation.
Secure Multi-party Protocol v.s. Anonymous Communication Protocol
Anonymous communication protocols [24, 11] were designed to achieve somewhat related goals, so why not use them? Anonymity techniques help to hide the identity of the information sender, rather than the information being sent. For example, when people browse the web, they can use anonymous communication protocols to keep their identities secret, but the web query usually is not secret because the web server has to know the query in order to send a reply back. In situations where the identity of the information sender needs to be protected, anonymous communication protocols are appropriate. However, there are situations where anonymous communication protocols cannot replace secure multi-party computation protocols. First, certain types of information intrinsically reveal the identity of someone related to the information (e.g., social security number). Secondly, in some situations, it is the information itself that needs to be protected, not the identity of the information sender. For instance, if Alice has an invention, she has to search if such an invention is new before she files for a patent. When conducting the query, Alice may want to keep the query private (perhaps to avoid part of her idea being stolen by people who have access to her query); she does not care whether her identity is revealed. Thirdly, in certain situations, one has to be a registered member in order to use the database access service; this makes hiding user's identity difficult because the user has to register and login first, which might already disclose her identity.
Furthermore, most of the known practical anonymous protocols, such as Crowds [24] , Onion routing [11] and Anonymizer.com use one or several trusted third parties. In our secure multi-party computation protocols, we do not use a trusted third party; even if a third party is used, we generally assume that the third party is not trusted, and should learn nothing about either Alice's query, or Bob's data, or about the response to the query.
Therefore anonymity does not totally solve our problems, and cannot replace secure multi-party computation. Rather, by combining anonymity techniques with secure multi-party computation techniques, one can achieve better overall privacy more efficiently.
Related Work
As Goldwasser points out in [12] , in the 80's the focus of research was to show the most general result possible, yielding multi-party protocol solutions for any probabilistic function. Much of the current work is to focus on efficient and non-interactive solutions to special important problems such as joint-signatures, joint-decryption, and secure and private database access.
Among various multi-party computation problems, the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem has been widely studied; it is also the problem most related to what we present in this paper (although here we use none of the elegant techniques for PIR that are found in the literature for reasons we explained earlier in this paper). The PIR problem consists of devising a protocol involving a user and a database server, each having a secret input. The database's secret input is called the data string, an AE-bit string
The user's secret input is an integer between 1 and Ò. The protocol should enable the user to learn in a communication-efficient way and at the same time hide from the database.
The trivial solution is having the database send an encryption of the entire string to the user. However, this solution is not efficient because of its Ç´AEµ communication complexity. Much work has been done to reduce the communication complexity [19, 6, 17, 16, 20, 22, 21, 13] . Our work is motivated by this framework, including its emphasis on reducing communication complexity.
Chor et al. point out that a major drawback of all known PIR schemes is the assumption that the user knows the physical address of the sought item [9] . In the current database query scenario, the user typically holds a keyword and the database internally converts this keyword into a physical address. To solve this problem, Chor et al. propose a scheme to privately access data by keywords [9] . The difference between the problem studied in Chor's paper and the problems in our paper is that we extend the problem to cover approximate pattern matching.
Song et al. propose a scheme to conduct searches on encrypted data [27] . The problem is that Alice has a database, and she has to store the database in a server controlled by Bob; how could Alice query her database without letting Bob know the contents of the database or the query? This problem is different from the PIR problem because Alice now knows all the inputs in this problem, whereas in the PIR problem Alice does not know Bob's input. Here we primarily focus on extending the problem to also cover approximate pattern matching.
There is much work on other types of secure multi-party computation problems, such as threshold cryptography [8] , private bidding [5] and secret-ballot elections [4] . Although they are different from our problems, we believe that the techniques they use are also useful in solving our problems.
Multi-party protocols use a rich body of tools and sub-protocols, some of which were developed for particular applications, while others were developed for general cryptographic settings. These include zeroknowledge proofs, probabilistic encryption, oblivious transfer, various distributed commitment schemes [25] , computing with shares of a secret [26] , and instance hiding schemes [7, 1] .
Framework

Models
Remote database access has many variants. In some e-commerce models, Bob's database is private while in some other models, it is public. In the latter case, there is no requirement to keep the database secret from Alice; however, the privacy of Alice's query still needs to be preserved. In other e-commerce models, Bob hosts Alice's (encrypted/disguised) database while supporting queries from Alice and other customers, in which case Bob should know neither the database nor the queries. For the sake of convenience, we will use Å Ø ´µ to represent the pattern matching function, which includes both exact pattern matching and approximate pattern matching.
Private Information Matching Problem (PIM)
Alice has a string Ü, and Bob has a database of strings Ì Ø ½ Ø AE ; Alice wants to know the result of Å Ø ´Ü Ì µ. Because of the privacy concern, Alice does not want Bob to know the query Ü or the result;
Bob does not want Alice to know any string in the database except for what can be derived from the reply.
Furthermore, Bob wants to make money from providing such a service, therefore Alice should not be able to conduct the querying by herself; in other words, every time Alice wants to perform such a query, she has to contact Bob, otherwise she cannot get the correct answer.
Private Information Matching from Public Database Problem (PIMPD)
Bob has a database of strings Ì Ø ½ Ø AE , whose contents are public knowledge. Alice has a query Ü, and she wants to know the result of Å Ø ´Ü Ì µ. However, because of the privacy concern, Alice does not want to disclose her query Ü to Bob.
This problem is different from the PIM problem: in the PIM problem, Bob does not allow Alice to know any information about the database except for what can be derived from the reply. In the PIMPD problem, since the database contains only public knowledge, there is no need to prevent Bob from letting Alice know more about the contents of the database than the strict answer to her query (although Bob's doing so may result in unnecessary communication).
Secure Storage Outsourcing Problem (SSO)
Alice has a database of strings Ì Ø ½ Ø AE , but she does not have enough storage for the large database, so she outsources her database (suitably disguised-more on this later) to Bob, who provides enough storage for Alice. Furthermore, from time to time, Alice needs to query her database and retrieves the information that matches her query, i.e., Alice wants to know Å Ø ´Ü Ì µ for her query Ü. For the sake of privacy, Alice wants to keep the contents of both the database and the query secret from Bob.
Secure Storage and Computing Outsourcing Problem (SSCO)
The SSCO problem is an extension of the SSO problem. While the database is exclusively queried by Alice only in the SSO problem, in the SSCO model the database will also be queried by other clients of Alice.
More specifically, in the SSCO model, Alice outsources her database to Bob, and she wants the database to be available to anyone who is willing to pay her for the database access service. When a client accesses the database, neither Alice nor Bob should know the contents of the query. Moreover, Alice wants to charge the clients for each query they have submitted, so the client should not be able to get the correct query result if
Alice is not aware of the query's existence.
Since Bob can pretend to be a client, the solutions of the SSCO problem should be secure even if Bob can collude against Alice with any client. However, the SSO problem does not have such a concern because the only client is Alice herself.
Formalized Problems
For each model, there is a family of problems. We will use the following notations to represents each specific The Å/Exact problem has been studied extensively in certain model, such as PIM and SSO, but the Å/Approx problem has not. Our results deal mostly with the Å/Approx problem.
Our Results
PIM/Approx
Except for the research on the general secure multi-party computation problem, this specific problem has not been studied in the literature. Unless otherwise specified, we assume alphabet used in the following solution to be predefined and its size to be finite. This assumption is quite reasonable in many situations; for instance, DNA sequences use a fixed alphabet of four symbols. Under this assumption, we can solve the PIM/Approx/ problem. However, because the way to calculate edit distance cannot be represented in the form È Ò ½ ´ µ, the PIM/Approx/Edit problem is not a special case of the PIM/Approx/ problem. We also have a solution for PIM/Approx/Edit/String problem, but because of its complexity and space limitation, we will leave the solution to the journal version of this paper.
In some other situations, the above finite alphabet assumption does not apply. For instance, fingerprint, image and voice patterns use real numbers instead of characters from a known finite alphabet. The abovementioned solution for the PIM/Approx/ problem cannot be used anymore, however by exploiting the mathematical property of È Ò ½´ µ ¾ , we have come up with a solution for the PIM/Approx/Squ problem for infinite alphabet after introducing an untrusted third party who does not know the inputs from either of the two parties and learns nothing about them (or about the query, or the answer to it). We also have a solution to the PIM/Approx/Abs problem using a Monte Carlo technique. All of these are given below.
PIM/Approx/Squ Protocol
Suppose that Bob has a database Ì Ø ½ Ø AE , and assume the length of each element is Ò; Alice wants to know the Ø ¾ Ì that most closely matches a query Ü Ü ½ Ü Ò based on the PIM/Approx/Squ metrics.
The requirement is that Bob should not know Ü or the result, and Alice should not be able to learn more information than the reply from Bob.
We propose a protocol to compute the matching score using a untrusted third party, Ursula. Our assumption here is that Ursula cannot conspire with either Alice or Bob. However, the third party is not considered as trusted; therefore, Ursula should not be able to deduce either Ü or Ì , or the final matching score ×. This protocol works for both finite and infinite alphabet. The purpose of Ê is to prevent Ursula from knowing the actual score, and the purpose of É and Ê is to disguise the query Ü. Alice does not need to put Ü in the first row of Å, instead, she can put it in any row of Å, and then sends to Ursula the corresponding row of É ½ ; only Alice knows which row of Å is vector Ü. The communication cost of the above protocol is Ç´Ò ¾ £ AEµ.
PIM/Approx/Abs Protocol
First, we will present a Monte Carlo technique for Alice and Bob to calculate Ü Ý , and then use it as a building block to compute È Ò ½ Ü Ý . The protocol involves an untrusted third party, Ursula, who learns nothing except Ü Ý · Ê , where Ê is a random number unknown to her. The protocol works for both finite and infinite alphabet. Assume that ¼ Ü Í and ¼ Ý Í for some number Í. The protocol for Ü Ý is (in what follows Ï is a parameter that affects the accuracy of the estimate, and ÓÙÒØ Ö ¼ initially):
1. Alice generates a random number Ê , and then generates Ï Ê random numbers uniformly oveŕ ¼ Í . 
PIM/Approx/ protocol
If the alphabet is predefined and its size is finite, we can solve a general problem-computing ´Ü Ý µ. However, we cannot directly use this protocol Ò times to compute È Ò ½ ´Ü Ý µ because that would reveal each individual result of ´Ü Ý µ. We will present the protocol for computing ´Ü Ý µ here, and then in the following sub-section, we will discuss how to use it as a building block to compute È Ò ½ ´Ü Ý µ without revealing any individual ´Ü Ý µ.
Suppose Alice has an input Ü ; Bob has an input Ý ; Alice wants to know the result of ´Ü Ý µ without revealing Ü and the result to Bob, and Bob does not want to reveal its Ý to Alice. If Alice can derive Ý from ´Ü Ý µ, that is beyond the scope of this problem. We present a solution to this problem. Later we will use this solution as a building block to construct solutions to other problems.
-function Protocol
We assume the encryption methods used below are commutative. 4. Alice chooses a secret key ¼ , computes ¼´ ´ ´Ü Ý µµµ, and sends it back to Bob.
5. Because of the commutative properties of ¼ and , ¼´ ´ ´Ü Ý µµµ is equivalent to ´ ¼´ ´Ü Ý µµµ, which could be decrypted to ¼´ ´Ü Ý µµ by Bob. Bob sends the result ¼´ ´Ü Ý µµ to Alice.
6. Alice gets ´Ü Ý µ by decrypting ¼´ ´Ü Ý µµ.
The technique used above is similar to the standard oblivious transfer protocol; it protects the privacy of the inputs from both parties without introducing a third-party. The communication cost is Ç´Ñµ, where Ñ is the size of the alphabet.
PIM/Approx/ Protocol
First, let us see how to securely compute È Ò ½ ´Ü Ý µ. As we discussed above, we cannot run the above -function protocol Ò times to get È Ò ½ ´Ü Ý µ. In the following protocol, we will use a disguise technique to hide each individual result of ´Ü Ý µ. Because Ü Ý ,´Ü Ý µ ¾ and AE´Ü Ý µ functions are special cases of ´Ü Ý µ, PIM/Approx/(Abs, Squ, AE) problems can all be solved using the above protocol.
PIMPD/Approx
The only difference between the PIM model and the PIMPD model is that, in the latter, Bob does not need to keep the database secret from Alice. Therefore, All solutions in the PIM model can be applied to the PIMPD model as well. Whether the "public" feature of the database can result in more efficient solutions is an interesting question. Although we do not yet have an answer to it, we observed the following: Proof. A two-party non-interactive protocol means Bob, by himself, is able to find the item in the database that has minimal distance from the query.
Assume there is a two-party non-interactive protocol which solves any of the PIMPD/Approx problems, in another words, given an encrypted/disguised form (Õ ¼ ) of a query Õ, and the database Ì that Bob knows, Bob can find the item in the database that has minimal distance from Õ as follows. We use ´Ì Õ ¼ µ to represent the algorithm on input Ì and Õ ¼ .
Since Bob can use any database he wants, he can use a database like this: Ì ¼ = "axxxxxx", "bxxxxxx", ..., "zxxxxxx" , supposing that the alphabet is a set from 'a' to 'z'. After applying ´Ì ¼ Õ ¼ µ, Bob will get one that has the minimal distance from Õ. For instance, if "mxxxxxx" is the result, Bob knows that 'm' is the first character in Õ. Since is a non-interactive protocol, Bob can reuse it on another database constructed for the purpose of exposing the second character in Õ; he can keep doing this and figure out the rest of the characters in Õ.
Therefore, if such a protocol existed, the query Õ would not be kept secret from Bob.
The theorem does not rule out the existence of an efficient interactive protocol or a multi-party protocol.
SSO/Approx
In this model, Bob is a service provider who provides storage and database query services to Alice. According to Alice's privacy requirement, Bob should know nothing about the database that he stores for Alice, nor should he know the query. So Bob has to conduct a database query based on the encrypted or disguised data of Alice.
The requirement that Bob should not know the query result, as in the PIM and PIMPD problem, is not The SSO/Approx problem is similar to secure outsourcing of scientific computations problems studied by Atallah et al. [3] . The difference is that in secure outsourcing problems, inputs are provided by Alice every time a computation is conducted in Bob's side; therefore, Alice can encrypt/disguise the inputs differently in different rounds of the computation. However, in the SSO problem, one of the inputs (the database)
is encrypted/disguised only once, and this same input is used in all rounds of computations; this makes the problem more difficult.
So far, we have a solution only for SSO/Approx/Squ problem. The solution works for both infinite and finite alphabet.
SSO/Approx/Squ Protocol
Suppose that Alice wants to outsource her database Ì Ø ½ Ø AE to Bob, and wants to know if query string Ü Ü ½ Ü Ò matches any pattern Ø in the database Ì .
The straightforward solution would be to let Bob send the whole database back to Alice, and let Alice conduct the query by herself. Although this solution satisfies the privacy requirement, much better communication complexity can be achieved. Another intuitive question would be whether Bob can conduct the matching independently after Alice sends him the relevant information about the query. If the answer is true, Bob should be able to find the item Ø that has the closest match to the query Ü. In another words, if Ø Ý ½ Ý Ò and × ÓÖ È Ò ½´Ü Ý µ ¾ , then Bob should be able to find the minimum value of × ÓÖ . However, because of the privacy requirement, Bob is not allowed to know the actual query Ü, nor is he allowed to know the content of the database, so how does he compute the distance × ÓÖ between Ü and each of the element Ø in the database?
The idea behind our solution is based on the fact that Ü ¡ Þ Ì ´ ÜÉ ½ µ ¡´É Þ Ì µ, where É is an invertible matrix. Alice can store É Þ Ì instead of Þ Ì at Bob's site, and keeps É secret from Bob. She will send ÜÉ ½ to Bob each time she wants to send a query Ü; therefore Bob can compute Ü ¡ Þ Ì without even knowing Ü and Þ. Ç´Òµ, which is optimal because that is how long the answer is. Notice that we have introduced random numbers Ê, Ê , Ê for ½ AE. The purpose of Ê is to prevent Bob from knowing the actual distance between Ü and the items in the database; the purpose of Ê is to prevent Bob from knowing the relationship between two different queries; the purpose of Ê is to prevent Bob from knowing the relationship among items in the database. Without Ê , two similar items in the database Ì would still be similar to each other in the disguised database Ì ¼ ; adding a different random number to each different item will make this similarity disappear.
SSCO/Approx
This model poses more challenges than the SSO model becase Bob could now collude against Alice with a client, or he can even become a client. Therefore, one of the threats would be whether Bob is able to compromise the privacy of the database by conducting a small number of queries and deriving the way the database is encrypted or disguised. A secure protocol should resist this type of active attack. We have an solution for the SSCO/Approx/Squ problem that works for both infinite and finite alphabet. In what follows, we assume that Alice outsourced the database Ì ¼ Þ ½ Þ AE to Bob. 
Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed four models for secure remote database access, and presented a class of problems and solutions for these models. For some problems, such as SSO/Approx/Squ and SSCO/Approx/Squ problems, our solutions are practical, and they only need Ç´Òµ and Ç´Ò ¾ µ communication cost, respectively; while for PIM/Approx and PIMPD/Approx problems, our results are still at the theoretical stage because of their high communication cost. Improving the communication cost for those solutions is one avenue for future work;
another avenue is the non-sequential pattern matching: the pattern matching problems that we have discussed only involve patterns of simple sequential structure; in many applications, patterns have a branching structure, such as a tree or a DAG. The Å/Approx/Edit/Tree problem in our model is one of the examples.
Developing a secure protocol to deal with this type of query is a challenging problem.
